The Kurdish Region A Beacon of Progress in the Middle East

 

In recent years, the Kurdish region has emerged as a symbol of stability and advancement in a region often marked by conflict. The Kurdish people have shown remarkable resilience, creating a dynamic society that embraces both tradition and modernity.

Economically, Kurdistan is demonstrating steady growth, attracting investment, and nurturing entrepreneurial initiatives. Its cities, including Erbil and Sulaymaniyah, are becoming hubs of commerce and innovation, reflecting a vision for sustainable development.

Politically, the region has made important strides in strengthening democratic governance. Local institutions are increasingly transparent and inclusive, providing a model for civic participation in the Middle East.

Culturally, the Kurds are preserving their rich heritage while promoting education and gender equality. Women’s empowerment initiatives and educational reforms are fostering a generation of leaders who are shaping a more equitable society.

Regional Developments: Steps Toward Autonomy and Federation

Beyond Iraq, Kurdish communities in neighboring countries are also pursuing paths toward greater self-governance.

In Iran, Kurdish areas have experienced ongoing conflicts, but local communities continue to express aspirations for federal structures that would grant meaningful autonomy. Kurdish leaders and civil society advocate for cultural rights, local governance, and economic opportunities. Despite tensions, these movements reflect a persistent hope for peaceful coexistence, political inclusion, and recognition of Kurdish identity within the Iranian state.

Kurdish Response Amid the US–Israel–Iran Conflict

Amid the ongoing military campaign launched by the United States and Israel against Iran, which has entered its second week, Kurdish communities in Iranian Kurdistan (Rojhelat) are responding with cautious optimism and pragmatism.

• Kurdish Militias and Political Forces: Some Iranian Kurdish opposition groups have been in contact with U.S. officials, exploring potential roles if the conflict expands. However, they currently avoid cross-border attacks, emphasizing that any involvement should be strategic and voluntary.

• Local Kurdish Expectations: Civilians and activists hope that the current instability may create political space for reforms, greater cultural rights, and autonomy. At the same time, leaders stress avoiding actions that could endanger Kurdish civilians or escalate regional tensions.

• Broader Outlook: Kurdish communities maintain a mix of cautious hope and pragmatic restraint, balancing the desire for self-determination with the need to remain independent from external military agendas.

In Turkey, grassroots initiatives and political movements are advocating for expanded regional autonomy, focusing on cultural preservation, Kurdish-language education, and local governance reforms.

In Syria, Kurdish regions have successfully established self-administration structures that prioritize democracy, women's rights, and pluralism, serving as a model for decentralized governance even in a complex conflict environment.

By fostering dialogue, inclusive governance, and regional cooperation, Kurdish communities across Iraq, Iran, Turkey, and Syria are demonstrating a shared commitment to peace, stability, and prosperity. Their experiences highlight the potential of autonomy and federation as tools for development, cultural preservation, and regional harmony, even in areas affected by conflict.

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The Israel-Iran War and the Political Autonomy and Self-Governance Prospects of Eastern Kurdistan

 

The Israel-Iran War and the Political Autonomy and Self-Governance Prospects of Eastern Kurdistan (Rojhilat) Kurds: Opportunities and Risks

Eastern Kurdistan (Rojhilat), located in western Iran, is home to a significant Kurdish population, primarily residing in the provinces of Kurdistan, West Azerbaijan, Kermanshah, and Ilam. Comprising approximately 7-10% of Iran’s population, the majority of Rojhilat Kurds are Sunni Muslims. Iran’s centralized policies and suppression of Kurdish cultural, linguistic, and political rights have kept autonomy demands alive throughout history. A potential war between Israel and Iran could disrupt regional dynamics, creating both opportunities and significant risks for Rojhilat Kurds. This analysis examines the impact of such a conflict on the prospects for political autonomy and self-governance in Rojhilat, through geopolitical, historical, and socio-political lenses.

Historical Context

Rojhilat Kurds have played a significant role in modern Iranian history, particularly in their struggles for autonomy and independence. The short-lived Mahabad Republic, established in 1946 with Soviet support, remains a symbol of Kurdish aspirations for self-governance. Following the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the 1988 Iran-Iraq War, Kurds faced intense migration pressures and assimilation policies. Organizations such as the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) and the Free Life Party of Kurdistan (PJAK) have pursued autonomy or independence through differing ideological approaches. However, Iran’s strong centralized control and the presence of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) have consistently suppressed these efforts.

Potential Scenarios of an Israel-Iran War and Impacts on Rojhilat

A war between Israel and Iran could manifest directly or indirectly through proxy forces. Iran’s proxies, such as Hezbollah and Hashd al-Shaabi, along with its nuclear program, are key concerns for Israel. Such a conflict could weaken Iran’s internal stability, potentially creating space for Rojhilat Kurds to advance their political goals. Below, the potential impacts on Rojhilat are analyzed.

1. Opportunities

a. Iran’s Internal Weakness and Loosening Central Control

In a war scenario, Iran would likely divert significant resources to external fronts, potentially reducing its capacity to enforce repressive policies in Rojhilat. The 2022 protests sparked by Jina Amini’s death demonstrated the potential for Kurdish mobilization against the regime. A war could reignite such movements, creating opportunities for autonomous governance.

b. Regional and International Support

Israel’s historical “periphery doctrine” has fostered ties with Kurdish groups, making it a potential supporter of Rojhilat Kurds to weaken Iran. Israel could provide logistical or military assistance. Additionally, the United States’ stance against Iran could indirectly bolster Kurdish movements in Rojhilat, similar to the support given to the PYD/YPG in Syria.

c. Integration with Regional Kurdish Movements

Rojhilat Kurds share cultural and political ties with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq and the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria. A war could enhance cooperation among these groups. For instance, the KRG’s economic and military capacity could provide logistical support to Rojhilat’s movements.

d. Inspiration for Self-Governance Models

The autonomous administration model in Syria could serve as a blueprint for Rojhilat. This commune-based, multi-ethnic, and women-focused model has the potential to unite diverse ethnic and religious groups in Rojhilat. The chaos of war could provide an opportunity to experiment with such a model.

2. Risks

a. Iran’s Harsh Crackdowns

Iran is likely to view any autonomy efforts in Rojhilat as “separatism” and respond with severe repression. The IRGC’s strong presence in the region and past assassinations of KDPI leaders highlight the gravity of this risk. A war could make Iran more paranoid, intensifying crackdowns on Kurds.

b. Regional Actors’ Conflicting Interests

Turkey, Iran, and Syria share a common opposition to Kurdish autonomy. Turkey’s operations in Afrin, Syria, demonstrate its stance against Kurdish self-governance. Support from Israel could unite these regional powers against Rojhilat’s Kurdish movements, potentially isolating them.

c. Internal Divisions

Rojhilat’s Kurdish movements are fragmented due to ideological and strategic differences. The KDPI’s reformist approach contrasts with PJAK’s more radical stance, hindering a unified autonomy vision. Additionally, tensions between tribal structures and modern political movements could complicate self-governance efforts.

d. International Indifference

The international community has shown less interest in Iran’s Kurdish issue compared to those in Syria or Iraq. A war’s impact on global energy markets and Iran’s nuclear program may overshadow Kurdish autonomy demands. Furthermore, Israel’s support could label Kurdish movements as “pro-Israel,” undermining their legitimacy.

Strategic Recommendations for Autonomy and Self-Governance

1. Diplomatic Efforts: Rojhilat Kurds should intensify lobbying through civil society organizations and the diaspora to gain international legitimacy. The Syrian autonomous administration’s office in Geneva serves as an example of such a strategy.

2. Unified Front: KDPI, PJAK, and other groups should unite around a shared autonomy vision. Dialogues between TEV-DEM and ENKS in Syria offer lessons for such efforts.

3. Multi-Ethnic Governance: Collaboration with Fars, Azeri, and other groups in Rojhilat could enhance the inclusivity of an autonomous administration. The Syrian model provides a useful framework.

4. Economic Independence: Post-war economic chaos may necessitate strengthening local economies in Rojhilat. Trade ties with the KRG could be critical in this process.

An Israel-Iran war presents both a historic opportunity and significant risks for Rojhilat Kurds. Iran’s potential weakening could create space for autonomy, but opposition from regional actors and internal divisions may limit these prospects. The success of Rojhilat Kurds will depend on their ability to forge a unified political vision, secure international support, and develop an inclusive governance model. The experiences of Kurds in Syria and Iraq serve as both inspiration and cautionary tales. Future developments will hinge on how effectively Rojhilat Kurds navigate this complex geopolitical landscape.

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The State of War on the Kobani-Manbij Frontline:

Developments on the Ground and Information from Open Sources:

The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) withdrew from Manbij following the intervention of the US-led Coalition and assurances of the following:"A ceasefire will be established."
"The Euphrates River will serve as the boundary."
"Civilians in Manbij city center will not be harmed, and no military presence will be maintained there."

However, the Turkish side rejected the ceasefire and continued its attacks. Civilians in Manbij city center were subjected to oppression, which led to uprisings among local tribes. Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) groups attempted to cross the Euphrates River and seize the Qereqozax Bridge and Tishrin Dam.

During this period, efforts were made to forcibly take the area east of Qereqozax Bridge, where the former site of the Suleyman Shah Tomb is located, and establish a military base there. The aim was to raise the flag and conduct propaganda. Despite Mazloum Abdi’s call for “dialogue” regarding the tomb site, a forced operation was launched to present a fabricated "victory." However, Turkey's underlying agenda was to use the tomb as a pretext to establish a heavily armed military base, encircle Kobani from the western front, and keep it under constant threat. For this reason, Mazloum Abdi’s reasonable proposal was not accepted.

To achieve these objectives, relentless and intense attacks were carried out for 14 consecutive days. The most significant assaults occurred on December 21, lasting 12 hours. The day after the attacks, Hakan Fidan traveled to Damascus while Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) commanders reached the border area. These visits were planned to coincide with an intended capture of the region, as a display of power. However, the assaults were repelled, and the SNA suffered significant losses.

Special warfare tactics, live broadcasts, and threats like "we're coming, any moment now" were employed to instill fear in Kobani’s population and force them to flee.

The December 21 Attacks and the SDF’s Response:

After the December 21 attacks were thwarted, the SDF bolstered its defensive strategies with renewed vigor.Operation to Defend Manbij Initiated: An operation was launched around Manbij, the focal point of attacks on Tishrin Dam and Qereqozax Bridge. The operation was named "Martyr Eziz Arab Manbij Campaign."

(Eziz Arab was a member of a local Arab family and an SDF fighter who served as a commander on this front. He lost his life in the clashes.)

Recent Developments:

The operation, which began yesterday and is ongoing, represents an active and preemptive defensive effort.SDF’s New Position: This operation is a response to attacks targeting Kobani, despite the SDF’s efforts for a ceasefire and reasonable solutions.
Answering the People’s Call: The operation also responds to calls for help from the people of Manbij. Its objective is the liberation of Manbij and will proceed with this goal in mind.

The Course of the Conflict and the SDF’s Strategy:

Looking at the 15-day conflict, it is evident that the SDF has maintained significant initiative. Their strategies include:Air Superiority: The SDF uses aerial assets to monitor and strike enemy forces. Numerous videos have been released showcasing this. Additionally, two Turkish drones were shot down, with visual evidence provided.
Tunnel Defense: SDF fighters utilized pre-prepared tunnels for area defense and maintained control.
Counteroffensives: While strengthening area control and defense, SDF fighters launched counterattacks when necessary, further weakening the SNA. This left the SNA vulnerable both on the ground and in the air.
SNA Weakening: Despite direct coordination and air support from Turkey, the SNA is faltering in clashes. Its already limited combat capability continues to diminish. Psychological dominance is with the SDF. Morale within SNA ranks is also deteriorating due to the situation in other regions, with fighters questioning their presence in the area, saying, "What are we even doing here?" Many have fled, as their motivation to fight for Turkish state objectives—beyond the $300-500 payments they receive—has vanished.

This defense strategy, coupled with the population’s refusal to abandon the area, is undermining Turkey’s plans.

What Lies Ahead?It remains uncertain how far the SDF will extend its defensive operations. No official statement has been made about entering Manbij city center.
The SNA appears to be encircled in the region, with signs of accelerated disintegration.
Potential Turkish strategies:Deploying direct military forces, which could lead to direct clashes between TAF and SDF.
Opening new fronts to divert the SDF’s attention.
Increasing airstrikes
If these efforts fail, initiating negotiations to transfer the region to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS


The US Position:

Having mediated the ceasefire but failed to pressure the other side adequately, the US’s stance remains unclear. They are likely to observe developments and adopt a position based on the prevailing outcomes. Until now, the approach of the US and EU has been limited to expressing "deep concerns," without leading to concrete results.

Amed DİCLE

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