The Israel-Iran War and the Political Autonomy and Self-Governance Prospects of Eastern Kurdistan

 

The Israel-Iran War and the Political Autonomy and Self-Governance Prospects of Eastern Kurdistan (Rojhilat) Kurds: Opportunities and Risks

Eastern Kurdistan (Rojhilat), located in western Iran, is home to a significant Kurdish population, primarily residing in the provinces of Kurdistan, West Azerbaijan, Kermanshah, and Ilam. Comprising approximately 7-10% of Iran’s population, the majority of Rojhilat Kurds are Sunni Muslims. Iran’s centralized policies and suppression of Kurdish cultural, linguistic, and political rights have kept autonomy demands alive throughout history. A potential war between Israel and Iran could disrupt regional dynamics, creating both opportunities and significant risks for Rojhilat Kurds. This analysis examines the impact of such a conflict on the prospects for political autonomy and self-governance in Rojhilat, through geopolitical, historical, and socio-political lenses.

Historical Context

Rojhilat Kurds have played a significant role in modern Iranian history, particularly in their struggles for autonomy and independence. The short-lived Mahabad Republic, established in 1946 with Soviet support, remains a symbol of Kurdish aspirations for self-governance. Following the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the 1988 Iran-Iraq War, Kurds faced intense migration pressures and assimilation policies. Organizations such as the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) and the Free Life Party of Kurdistan (PJAK) have pursued autonomy or independence through differing ideological approaches. However, Iran’s strong centralized control and the presence of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) have consistently suppressed these efforts.

Potential Scenarios of an Israel-Iran War and Impacts on Rojhilat

A war between Israel and Iran could manifest directly or indirectly through proxy forces. Iran’s proxies, such as Hezbollah and Hashd al-Shaabi, along with its nuclear program, are key concerns for Israel. Such a conflict could weaken Iran’s internal stability, potentially creating space for Rojhilat Kurds to advance their political goals. Below, the potential impacts on Rojhilat are analyzed.

1. Opportunities

a. Iran’s Internal Weakness and Loosening Central Control

In a war scenario, Iran would likely divert significant resources to external fronts, potentially reducing its capacity to enforce repressive policies in Rojhilat. The 2022 protests sparked by Jina Amini’s death demonstrated the potential for Kurdish mobilization against the regime. A war could reignite such movements, creating opportunities for autonomous governance.

b. Regional and International Support

Israel’s historical “periphery doctrine” has fostered ties with Kurdish groups, making it a potential supporter of Rojhilat Kurds to weaken Iran. Israel could provide logistical or military assistance. Additionally, the United States’ stance against Iran could indirectly bolster Kurdish movements in Rojhilat, similar to the support given to the PYD/YPG in Syria.

c. Integration with Regional Kurdish Movements

Rojhilat Kurds share cultural and political ties with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq and the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria. A war could enhance cooperation among these groups. For instance, the KRG’s economic and military capacity could provide logistical support to Rojhilat’s movements.

d. Inspiration for Self-Governance Models

The autonomous administration model in Syria could serve as a blueprint for Rojhilat. This commune-based, multi-ethnic, and women-focused model has the potential to unite diverse ethnic and religious groups in Rojhilat. The chaos of war could provide an opportunity to experiment with such a model.

2. Risks

a. Iran’s Harsh Crackdowns

Iran is likely to view any autonomy efforts in Rojhilat as “separatism” and respond with severe repression. The IRGC’s strong presence in the region and past assassinations of KDPI leaders highlight the gravity of this risk. A war could make Iran more paranoid, intensifying crackdowns on Kurds.

b. Regional Actors’ Conflicting Interests

Turkey, Iran, and Syria share a common opposition to Kurdish autonomy. Turkey’s operations in Afrin, Syria, demonstrate its stance against Kurdish self-governance. Support from Israel could unite these regional powers against Rojhilat’s Kurdish movements, potentially isolating them.

c. Internal Divisions

Rojhilat’s Kurdish movements are fragmented due to ideological and strategic differences. The KDPI’s reformist approach contrasts with PJAK’s more radical stance, hindering a unified autonomy vision. Additionally, tensions between tribal structures and modern political movements could complicate self-governance efforts.

d. International Indifference

The international community has shown less interest in Iran’s Kurdish issue compared to those in Syria or Iraq. A war’s impact on global energy markets and Iran’s nuclear program may overshadow Kurdish autonomy demands. Furthermore, Israel’s support could label Kurdish movements as “pro-Israel,” undermining their legitimacy.

Strategic Recommendations for Autonomy and Self-Governance

1. Diplomatic Efforts: Rojhilat Kurds should intensify lobbying through civil society organizations and the diaspora to gain international legitimacy. The Syrian autonomous administration’s office in Geneva serves as an example of such a strategy.

2. Unified Front: KDPI, PJAK, and other groups should unite around a shared autonomy vision. Dialogues between TEV-DEM and ENKS in Syria offer lessons for such efforts.

3. Multi-Ethnic Governance: Collaboration with Fars, Azeri, and other groups in Rojhilat could enhance the inclusivity of an autonomous administration. The Syrian model provides a useful framework.

4. Economic Independence: Post-war economic chaos may necessitate strengthening local economies in Rojhilat. Trade ties with the KRG could be critical in this process.

An Israel-Iran war presents both a historic opportunity and significant risks for Rojhilat Kurds. Iran’s potential weakening could create space for autonomy, but opposition from regional actors and internal divisions may limit these prospects. The success of Rojhilat Kurds will depend on their ability to forge a unified political vision, secure international support, and develop an inclusive governance model. The experiences of Kurds in Syria and Iraq serve as both inspiration and cautionary tales. Future developments will hinge on how effectively Rojhilat Kurds navigate this complex geopolitical landscape.

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A Farewell to Two Great Hearts Ali Haydar Kaytan and Rıza Altun

 

In the long and painful journey of resistance, there are those whose names transcend the battlefield and become eternal symbols of commitment, courage, and unwavering belief in justice. Ali Haydar Kaytan and Rıza Altun were such souls — two great hearts who dedicated their entire lives to a cause larger than themselves.

Ali Haydar Kaytan, a founding member of the PKK, was not just a revolutionary, but also a thinker, a poet of the struggle. His clarity of vision and deep philosophical grounding helped shape a movement that has challenged oppression for decades. He was a man of words, but also of action — a leader who never asked of others what he wouldn’t do himself. In his humility and simplicity lived the greatness of a true fighter for freedom.

Rıza Altun, a comrade in arms and spirit, was a tireless organizer and a profound strategist. He believed not only in resistance but in transformation — of individuals, of society, and of history. Through his work, his writings, and his unshakable will, he inspired thousands. His life was marked by sacrifice, but also by love — love for his people, for justice, and for a future that belongs to all.

Today, as we say farewell to these two remarkable individuals, our hearts are heavy, yet full of pride. They have left us not in silence, but in the echo of their deeds. The mountains they walked, the words they spoke, and the lives they touched will forever remind us that true greatness lies in standing for what is just — even when the cost is life itself.

May the memory of Ali Haydar Kaytan and Rıza Altun live on in every step of the struggle, in every dream of freedom, and in every heart that refuses to surrender.

Rest in power, comrades. You are not gone — you have become part of the wind, the earth, and the unbreakable will of a people who continue your path.

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The Epic Soundscapes of Kayhan Kalhor A Kurdish Virtuoso Bridging Worlds

 

When words fall short, music speaks—and in the case of Kayhan Kalhor, it sings of longing, resilience, and the boundless spirit of a people. A master of the kamancheh, Kalhor is more than a virtuoso; he is a storyteller whose bow draws ancient landscapes and untold epics across the strings of his instrument.

Born into a Kurdish family in Iran, Kalhor's musical journey has spanned continents and genres. Deeply rooted in the classical traditions of Persian and Kurdish music, his compositions transcend cultural boundaries. His collaborations with artists from India, Turkey, and the West—like Yo-Yo Ma’s Silk Road Ensemble—have brought traditional Middle Eastern sounds to global audiences without compromising their authenticity.

What makes Kalhor's music truly powerful is its emotional depth. Pieces like Silent City and I Will Not Stand Alone are not just compositions; they are meditations on exile, memory, and home. His music is often wordless, but it speaks volumes—evoking wide open deserts, mountain winds, and the ache of displacement. The kamancheh in his hands becomes an extension of the voice, weeping and soaring with extraordinary expressiveness.

If you're new to Kalhor's work, here are a few essential tracks and albums to explore:

• "Silent City" (with Brooklyn Rider) – A haunting tribute to the Kurdish city of Halabja, destroyed in the 1988 chemical attack.

• "I Will Not Stand Alone" – A deeply personal album blending tradition with contemporary resonance.

• "Hawniyaz" – A collaboration with Kurdish singer Aynur and pianist Salman Gambarov, weaving classical Kurdish poetry into lush musical textures.

Listening to Kayhan Kalhor is not just an artistic experience—it’s a journey through the soul of a culture, a people, and a musician whose bow continues to echo the stories of the past while carving new ones for the future.

If you’re looking for music that’s both grounding and transcendent, steeped in history yet entirely alive—start with Kayhan Kalhor.

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Kurdistan Independence Initiative

We Stand Wholeheartedly with You in the Process of Independence  Statement from the Kurdistan Independence Initiative

Dear Mr. Masoud Barzani,
President of the Kurdistan Region

Given the current conditions in Iraq, the Middle East, and the world, the time is ripe for Southern Kurdistan to take steps toward independence. The move toward independence is the most natural and legitimate right of our nation, which has been subjected to historical injustices.

This historic moment must not fall victim to internal political conflicts. Our hope and expectation is that political, religious, national, social, civil, and official institutions will put aside all differences and speak with one voice, in unity, during the independence process.

Mr. President, the goal and greatest dream of millions of Kurds and Kurdistanis is for the South to gain independence and become a safe haven for all of Kurdistan.

Our desire and expectation is for the powers and parties of Kurdistan to achieve the broadest possible unity in order to ensure the success of the independence process. Your unifying and leading role in taking this deci

The entire world must know that we stand wholeheartedly with you in

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With the decision for an independence referendum having

With patriotic sentiments, the individuals who formed the Southern Kurdistan Independence Initiative:
Abit Gürses, Ceyhun Arslan, Vildan S. Tanrıkulu, Zozan Agid, Caziye Haco, Midia Cigerxwîn, Helal İsmail, Ako Gerdi, Temurê Xelil, Alan Fatohi, Reza Seyid Nejad.

The following individuals have supported this campaign with their valuable signatures:

The full list of names follows, unaltered, as per the original.

Halmat Mahmad Bawa, Brader Mûsikî, Hursit Kaplan, Şermin Bozarslan

Salih Kobani, Baran dersimi, Dayssam Haco, Şeyhmus Özzengin, Remzî Kerîm

Bawer Epözdemir, Bedirxan Epözdemir, Kovan Amedî, Hilal Alis, Vural Akgül

Pervin Alis, Ibrahim Uçar, Sukrî Demir, Mustafa UZUN, Mamoste Nûjen

Ilias Arian Shaddadi, Siyabend Kaya, Muzaffer Sipan, Cemal Onursal, Ozgur Harmanci

Rodi Ilgen, Gulgin Bozarslan, Fahri Ölçer, Aso xabat, Hiwa Zakarya, Hawre Madani

Bella Sturki, Mohammad Moulod, Alan Amedi, Çeko Haci Yusuf, Jan Ziyan, Vahit Aba

Remzî Kerîm, Yusuf Seyhan, Cemal Can, Nehayat Ahmad, Arjin Zend, Mehmet Yigit

Sebriye Boti, Renas Azad, Abdullah Demirtaş, Ayhan Geveri

Mecid Şahin, Hamza Aydın, Erkan Çardakçı, Sonja Hagen, Viyan Khaled, Fuad gülmüş

Battal Atlı, Sinan Alkayış, Şefîq Pêşeng, Hedi Arif, Mehmet Yigit, Ferman Al Kasari

Serkan Dogan, Ali Ciftci, Hakan Ener, Mahmud Lewendi, Gulcin Önen, Dr Nesrin Dêrikî Önen

Abidin Alkoyun, Cemal Ciziri, Ziad Issa, Sinam Haco, Okan Demir, Feridun Yavuzer

Shahram Mirhaj, Yuosef Sabri  Nerwayİ, Salem Said, Ibrahim Ali Murad, Ismaeel Mohammed

Glawish Sharif, Bakr Haje rahem, Azad h Shekh YouniS, Mehmet Sait Tank, Hüseyin yilmaz

Cemal Saygılı, Ramazan Demirörs, Narin Nadirova, Mehmet Tanriverdİ, Mehmet Yigit

Nebi Mistoyan, Fereydoun Seyyedi Sardasht, Hejarê Şamil, Nure Cewari, Sakib Uzun

Mehmet Tanrıkulu, Azad Salawati, Mehmet Sıddık Degirmen, Ibrahim Demir, Sabri Sevim

Yilmaz Yildiz, Azad Lordini, Metin Özer, Ferik Sadei, Hazari Cetinkaya, Rashid Nadirov

Mehmet Buyuk, Cemil Elma, Hasan Alpergin, Hamza Osmanov, Cemal Budak

Mehmet Yahya Ekmen, Cahide Öztaş, Dogan Karatas, Edıp Oner, Besim Gezici, Mehmet Taş

Mehmud Silopî, M Nuri ÖZKUR, Emrullah Bilir, Ilhami Mese, Aydin Dogru, Serap Bozkurt

Serhat Bertİ, Ali Aktekin, Alaaddin Orak, Mesut Bildik Sirac Ogur, Berna Karaca

 Nesim sevgi, Fahrettin Çağlar, Nazim Bicen, Abdulvahap Çam, Muslum Coban

İhsan Nuri Ataş, Muhammed Tugrul, Erkan Çardakçı, Zeynep Binici, Veysel Ozcoban

Emrullah Yaşar, Bsyram Deniz, Macıt Uçkun, Hüseyin Yalçınkaya, Ferhad Balkan

Mehmet Arslan, Seyran Duran, Orhan Bendas, Mehmet Dursun, Veysi Aykurt

Zanyar Gemici, Nezahat Yardimci, Salim Hassan, Riza Celik, Mehtap ışık, Aram Mirzade

Ahmet Mutlu, Anwar Kakai, Kheir Eddin Ali, Rezan İlter, Engin Bal, Nasser Sina

Hişyar Omar, Idris abdulsamad, Hozan Haco, Servet Yıldırım, Suwar Zedini, Roni güzel

Mustafa Çalıkoglu, Egit Binboga, Ferec Koyistani, Mansour Sedghi, Parvin Sidqi

Zehra Topgider, Sipan Ali Ismail, Hosein Bakhchi, Hüseyin Özalp, Mehmet Ali Duman

Kerem Senal, Haci Kardoxî, Bekir Uçar, Rafiq Baban, Cahit Çelik, Osman Cinar, Hikmet Agnig

Hatun Turan, Husamedin Motkizade, Ali Fikri Işık, Şakir Tutal, Pale Nujen, Sultan Arslan

Vakkas celik, Ciwan Dêrîkİ, Gurgin Bozan, Suayip Adlıg, Hamlet Muradov, Lorin Fissi

Saban Ciftci, Hedi Hamshin, Dilshad Kerkuki, Shapol  Pishnemaz, Sardar Mohammadian

Orhan Ates, Özgur Cihan Ruzeri, Zaher Husseini Idris Rashidi, Mansoor Saidi, Hasan Dere

Ахмет Гасанов Kazakhstan, Afsar Mohamadi, Seid Veroj, Reber Gardi

Yılmaz Elçi, Dayssam Haco, Mehlika Ferhunde Gürlük, Metin Kumaraslan

Rociwan Yesil, Azad Hassan Cegerxwin, Esmer Aydogan, Salihê Omerî

Aboubakr Shamsaddin, Mahmut Kaya, Ali Jouma, Uso Kurdman, Khaled Kamal Darwish

Emrullah Bilir, Ciwan Haco, İsmail Besikci, Murat Çiroğlu, Reşo Zîlan, Ali K. Yildirim

Sanaria Karem, Berfin Pakdemir, Devran Berk, Davut Kandemir, Pelin öcal, Rohat Alis

Viyan Saganda, Roni Tanrikulu, Nuri Sınır, Remzi Kerim, Seyda Alpşen

 Vildan Tanrikulu, Leyla Yeşîl, Madhat Mohammad Sulaiman, Sinem Haco

Bizhan Farhadian, Rûşen Arslan, Abdullah Akbas, Nezir Akat, Aynur Engin, Kadri Bayik

Ekrem Onen, Cagin Atik, Fahri Seker, Seyfi Balta,Nebahat Karaduman

Pola Nanvazadegan, Yusuf Yeşil, Nihat Duran, Adam P. Ahlenius, Gulseren Alpergin

Ali Kaya, Sarah Hansen, Ramazan Acar, Sabahat Karaduman, Baskar Nazhadeian

Mehlika Ferhunde Gürlük, Oksana Cehova, Viyan Dilan Stérk, Ibrahim ucar

Reşid Batte, Hajar Asad Kandastar, Süleyman Güney, Nuran Maraşlı

Osman Bilici, Ciya bicimli, Kemal Cengiz, Hoshin Hajo, Yılmaz Elçi, Salim Celiker

Metin Mirxan, Enver Yuzen, Mehmet Kaya, Eyyüp Alacabey, Rzgar Ramadhan Muhammad

Sexmus Merge, Mencê Aldûr, Анкудинов Андрей, T.  Majid Abdulrahman

Djamilya Kochoyan, Ihsan Anlas, Necmi Aksoy, Lorin Fissi, Selma Ipek, Hatice Kosar

Nedim Baran, Pervin Alis, Narin Aras, Baran Dersimi, Bestun Gardi, Necat Azizoglu

Bercem Fritzell, Aco Gard, Omer Xelikan, Cemal onursal, Mehmet Tanriverdi

Sait Curukkaya, Muzaffer sipan, Haydar Yildiz, Hilal Alis, Uzeyir Al, Mustafa Zeyrek

Mustafa Ozcelik, Ibrahim Dag, Lukman Hajo, Adnan Sezer, Namik yildizhan

Mistefa Ozer, Nuri celik, Omar Moslli, Ahmed Barwari, Majıed Gohary, Yavuz ilyas

Adil Yasak, Diyar Cevahir, Mihemed Rezan, Ismail Topuz, Mehmet Nasir Faruk

Mehmet Ali Duman, Yilmaz Yildiz, Firat aslan, Jean-Emmanuel Cebah, Cahit Cagabey

Oertuen Zilfo, Seraceddin kirici, Eisa Fili, Cahide Ozdag, Aydin Altundag

Shamzin Jihani, ilyas Baran, Salih Dundar, K. Madon, Sabri Eray

Adnan Schakmakli, Dogan Arpaci, Mithat Atilgan, Refik Incir, Hussein sarokhan

Mustafa Omar, Aygul Mervan, Ciwan Amedi, Necip Pehlivanoglu, Selim Kalpak

Ali Saltik, Sefin Yasin, Sabuha Cetinkaya, Narine Hajo, Dursun Evren, Ismet Demrci

Esref Doganer, İsmet Demirci, Hilmi Aydin, Serif Ziyan, Nurettin Sarac, Serhadd Sever

Adalet Karaaslan, Mesud Djangoi, Amin Duhuki, Özgur Ugur, Ivan Sindy, Hakan Ener

Helena Nordkvist, Rezan Celik, Selahattin Fazla, Bertil Resosson, Ebdulxaliq Perik

Cihat Polat, Mehmet inci, Hozan Abas, Zafer Biçici, Ridvan Saman, Suphi Demir

Nurettin olcay, Nilufer kaya, Seyfettin Kulaksiz, Emrullah Bilir, Muhittin Aslan

Mewan Dolamari, Omer Doner, Sedat Anter, Bengin Biyan, Amed Celiker, Alan Rasul

Serdar Fidan, Dr Bahat Haseeb Qaradakhy, Ewdil Direj Ararat, Baran Karaca

Abdurrahman Evsen, Aladdin Bozan, Hama Gharib, Haci Mahir Baran, Bozan Ersavas

Mahmut Kilinc, Bahri Karaaslan, Halit Temli, Erdal Karabulut, Ahmet Karaaslan

Yekta Uzunoglu, Muhammed Kavas, Şemsettin Gunes, Renas Welat, Mehmet Durmaz

Eser Karayel, Ilter Rezan, Nevzat Akmaz, Serhat Kurt, Rojda Yildirim, Vahit Aba, Ercan Aras

Bijar Mihemed Sidqi, KhoRshid Doski, Adnan Hewramani, Mehmet Ates, Ceza Shex Reza

Beyhani Sahin,  Behcet Ates, Maya Sigfridsson, Mello Guven, Ali sonmez, Mustafa Konyalı

Hecha Khalifazada, Berzan Ferho, Xalid ali, Cemal Ucar, İmam Cakir, Rizan Zaza

Yilmaz Yildiz, Kristofer Wallenius, Coskun Mehmed Emin, Yasar Bugurcu, Fatos xan

Erdogan Aktas, Bahtiyar Vanli, Zeynel Abidin Han, Karvan Delashob, Ali Cosar, Hasan kizil

Firat Nemrud, Resul Kizildag, Roza Kurd, Omid Salih, Seher Kaya, Ali Duman, Cesur Nujen

Hesen  Mete, Huseyin Alpergin, Rohat Bedikanli, Komela Spanga, Evindar Ozalp

Peshraw Azizi, Tomas Boylind, Faris Marsil, Truls Mansson, Bekir Madon, Mattias Sundquist

Shehbaz Cibran, Bewar Kestet, Naz Hassan, Dashti Bahadin, Pelle Nilsson, Temure Xelil

Hiyam Akbar, Michael Helders, Jakob Matanovic, Oskar von Zeipel, Arkan Mina

L. Smith Jonsson, Ozz Nujen, Nevzat Taskan,Rastam Hajo, Rodi Darwish, Sertac Kurmanc

Barzani Fisli, Peiam Toffik Arif, Mustafa Beydogan, Dicle Aslan, Rizgar Danisman

Hevind Hajo,  Ali Jabar, Mehmet Cimen, Ercan Zent, Valery Rzgoyan, Djamal Balayev

Ramazan KIZIL, Recep Ozmen, Loran Hajo, Nesim Dogan, M Lütfi Çifçi, Omer Erdal Kurt

Bekir Uzunel, Feridun Kaya, Kamil Sumbul, Midia Hassan, Narine Hajo, Letif Bruki

Rasit karakaya, Shamal Lahouni, Abit Dundar, Chahoz Hajo, Kovan Amedi

Serkan Aydin, Ali Saltik, Siyabend Kaya, Keya Izol, Hozan Hajo, Alı Ertas, Tamoyan Flit

Achti Hajo, Ethem Deger, Bube Eser, Rastam Hajo, Mehmet dogru, Anare Barie Bala

Koma Kurdistana Azadi VK, Adem Delikaya, Ferik Sadei, Amadi Shakli, Imad Akreyi, Selda Aksoy

Mahir Aras, Aylin Karim, Yusuf Kaynak, Rustem Aslan, Fesih Seseoglu,Cengiz Yildirim

Osman Kasaci, Hamza Alpaslan, Murat Arslan, Nimet Mumtaz Aydin, Emin Dogan

Heyam Remi, Sedat Guncekti, Heval Batu, Mustafa kaya, Mehmet Serif Sener, Abdulbaki Arslan

Mustafa sarihan, Behzat Batté, Kutbettin Alis, Hasan Kavak, Mustafa Sarıca, Nihat Duran

Soren Nejadian, Sultan Arslan, Kayvan Seyed Nejadian, Feridun Kaya, Huseyin Kutlay

Serhad Bapir, Fatma Keskin, Rohat Miran, Muslum Celik, Seyfettin Karatay, Recep Marasli

Murat Kaya, Elind mayi, Sabri Dag, Jiyan Bİlli, Ferah Berda, Seyfi Balta, Mehmet Kutlu

Halit Guzelsoy, Serbest Harman, Muzaffer Oezguer, Hatun Turan, Sofi Demir

Sidqi Hirori, Sipan Ismail, Massoud Shamo, Ahmad Mayi, Nelly Malmkjar, Hikmet Ata

Helin Saado, Metin Esen, Alaettin İnce, Cecilia Lofgren, Selim Acar

Seyda alpsen, Refik Inci, Mica Ericsson, Bilal Goergue, Sait Akcan, Ferit Alagunduz

Bawer Kevir, Ihsan Qadir, Baran Hemze, Celal Uzun, Shohod Akrawi, Abdullah Kilic

Erol Can, Hivy Barwari, Osman Aydin, Zana Suphandagi Gormez, Şilan Yasar, Mahfuz Yildiz

Ismail Göz, Bawer Coskun, Welat Zeydanlioglu, Fatih Koca, Sedat Tuncer, Serdar İzol

Kemal Akil, Nihat Akar, Mustafa Aram, Cemal Batun, Miran Gurses, Zinare Xamo, Goran Gürses,

Jihan Nezhan Mustafa, Alan Fatohi, Reza Seyid Nejad, Ako Gardi, Helal İsmail, Zozan Agid, Jazia Hajo, Midya Cigerxîn, Mahir Taha, Jelia Agid, Têmurê Xelil, Vildan S. Tanrıkulu, Ceyhun Ran Arslan, Abit Gürses.

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The Birth of Kurdish National Unity and a New Resistance

 A New Chapter for an Independent, Unified, and Free Kurdistan

The Dissolution of the PKK and a Historical Turning Point

In 2027, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) decided to end its half-century-long armed struggle. The leadership announced the organization's dissolution at an international press conference. For the Kurdish people in Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria, this declaration marked the end of an era and the beginning of an uncertain future.

However, Kurdish nationalism was rooted in an idea and the historical consciousness of a people. The PKK's disarmament did not signify the end of this idea. On the contrary, national consciousness began to reshape itself more clearly and in a more organized manner.

The Anger of the New Generation: United Kurdistan National Movement (UKNM)

In the vacuum following the PKK, a young, educated, and radical cadre emerged from all four parts of Kurdistan (Bakur, Başûr, Rojhilat, Rojava), including the diaspora. This new structure, named the "United Kurdistan National Movement (UKNM)," adopted a confederal, secular, and nationalist approach, distancing itself from centralized ideology.

UKNM declared a "People's Armed Resistance," arguing that peaceful means could not achieve their goals. Their objective was to weaken central authorities through simultaneous armed actions in Kurdish regions, draw international attention, and ultimately establish an independent Kurdish state.

A New Doctrine in Armed Struggle

The armed wing of the new movement, the Kurdistan National Resistance Forces (KNRF), adopted hybrid warfare methods instead of classical guerrilla tactics:

• Coordinated attacks in urban centers,

• Sabotage of energy infrastructure,

• Cyber warfare and propaganda activities,

• Financial and logistical support from the international Kurdish diaspora.

The initial actions were simultaneously carried out in Diyarbakır, Mahabad, Qamishli, and Erbil against enemies of the Kurds. In the operation called "4 Cities in 4 Hours," security units of occupying forces in Kurdistan were targeted, with a primary principle of avoiding harm to civilians. The movement maintained a disciplined yet decentralized cellular structure.

A New Unity in Kurdish Nationalism

This new wave aimed to build a pan-Kurdish national unity project, differing from the leftist ideological Kurdish movements of the 20th century. It sought to end the long-standing ideological and organizational divisions among the HDP line in Turkey, the KDP and PUK in Iraq, PJAK in Iran, and PYD in Syria.

With the slogan "One flag, four parts, one nation," UKNM aimed to become an umbrella movement that did not exclude ideological diversity but united on Kurdish identity and the idea of independence.

International Reactions and Regional Transformation

The USA, EU, and Russia responded cautiously to this new armed movement. While some countries supported the Kurdish struggle for rights, they refrained from openly endorsing armed actions.

Regional countries perceived these developments as a "national security threat" and initiated counter-operations. Martial law was declared in southeastern Turkey, while Iran and Syria launched joint border operations.

Kurds at the Threshold of History

The new Kurdish nationalism presents a more strategic, unified, and international profile, drawing from past experiences. How this movement evolves will profoundly affect not only the Kurdish people but also the futures of Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria.

This new balance between armed struggle and political objectives could rewrite the destiny of a people. It may herald a new catastrophe or lead a revolution that changes the borders of the modern Middle East.

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Source: Cahit Çağabey, "Kurdish National Unity and the Birth of the New Resistance", January 8, 2016.

https://cahit-cagabey.blogspot.com/2016/01/kizil-kurdistan-rojava.html

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The Implications of PKK’s Decision to Lay Down Arms

 

The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) announced today that it will lay down arms, marking a potentially historic turning point in Turkey's decades-long conflict with the group. While the declaration alone is significant, the real impact will depend on how this transition is managed by both the PKK and the Turkish state. The coming weeks will be critical in shaping the future of peace, political stability, and Kurdish rights in the region.

1. Immediate Security and Verification Measures

One of the first steps following such a declaration is ensuring that the ceasefire holds on both sides. Independent observers or third-party verification mechanisms could help confirm that the PKK is genuinely demobilizing. The Turkish government will likely maintain a cautious stance until it observes verifiable disarmament steps, such as the surrender or destruction of weapons and withdrawal from Turkish territory.

2. Reintegration and Amnesty Policies

If the process is to succeed, the reintegration of PKK fighters into civilian life will be essential. This may involve general or conditional amnesty programs, vocational training, and psychological support. Past examples, such as the Colombian peace process with FARC, demonstrate the importance of inclusive and well-structured reintegration initiatives.

3. Political and Legal Reforms

One of the main demands of the Kurdish movement has been increased cultural and political rights. The Turkish government may now face growing pressure—both domestically and internationally—to implement reforms that address Kurdish identity, language rights, and representation. Constitutional amendments or decentralization models could be topics of discussion, though such reforms would be politically sensitive.

4. Public Opinion and Social Cohesion

The success of the post-conflict period also hinges on public support. Mistrust between communities, nationalist sentiments, and the legacy of violence can all hinder reconciliation. Civil society organizations, media, and political leaders will need to play a proactive role in promoting dialogue, tolerance, and healing.

5. International Implications

PKK’s disarmament could also shift regional dynamics, particularly in Iraq and Syria, where affiliated Kurdish groups have played significant roles. Turkey may leverage this development to strengthen its diplomatic ties or push for a re-evaluation of the status of Kurdish groups in neighboring countries. On the other hand, international actors may now expect Turkey to adopt a more democratic and inclusive approach to its Kurdish population.

While the PKK's decision to lay down arms opens a door to peace, the road ahead is fraught with political, legal, and societal challenges. Constructive engagement, mutual trust, and a genuine commitment to democratic values will be key to transforming this moment into a sustainable resolution. Both Ankara and Kurdish representatives must now seize the opportunity to redefine their relationship—not through conflict, but through dialogue.

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Analysis of the Barzani Charity Foundation's Humanitarian Efforts

 

The Barzani Charity Foundation (BCF), named after the revered Kurdish leader Molla Mustafa Barzani, stands as a symbol of compassion and resilience in the face of humanitarian challenges. Based in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, the foundation has played a vital role in providing relief and support to vulnerable populations, particularly Kurds, internally displaced persons (IDPs), refugees, and impoverished communities across the region.

One of the most commendable aspects of BCF’s work is its unwavering commitment to humanitarian aid, regardless of ethnicity, religion, or nationality. The foundation has been instrumental in managing dozens of IDP and refugee camps, offering food, clean water, shelter, healthcare, and education to thousands of families fleeing conflict and persecution. Notably, BCF played a crucial role during the ISIS crisis, supporting Yazidi survivors, displaced Kurds from Mosul and Sinjar, and Syrian refugees escaping war.

The foundation also engages in long-term development projects aimed at improving quality of life. These include vocational training for youth and women, psychological support for trauma survivors, and the construction of schools and healthcare centers. BCF’s emphasis on dignity and self-reliance sets it apart from many aid organizations, as it works not only to meet immediate needs but also to empower communities for a sustainable future.

In addition, BCF is known for its swift response to natural disasters and emergencies, both within and beyond the Kurdistan Region. Whether it is delivering aid to earthquake victims in Syria or assisting flood-affected families in Iraq, the foundation consistently demonstrates solidarity and swift action.

Overall, the Barzani Charity Foundation exemplifies the values of humanitarianism, solidarity, and service. Its work has brought hope to countless individuals and continues to build bridges of compassion in a region often marked by hardship. The legacy of Molla Mustafa Barzani lives on through these noble efforts to uplift and support those in need.

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The Lausanne Kurdish Institute

 

The Lausanne Kurdish Institute: A Cultural Achievement, A Political Manifesto

The opening of the Lausanne Kurdish Institute is not merely a cultural initiative; it stands as a political manifesto articulating the Kurdish people's demand for international legitimacy through academic discourse. This institution is the concrete expression of an effort to redefine the long struggle for Kurdish existence—shaped by denial and assimilation—through the production of knowledge.

1. A Voice Under the Shadow of the Lausanne Treaty

The Treaty of Lausanne, signed in 1923, marked a turning point in the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, but also represented a rupture for the Kurdish people. Though present among the parties at the time, Kurds were excluded from the final content of the agreement, effectively denying them recognition as a nation. Since then, the Kurds have endured political and cultural exclusion. Establishing a Kurdish institute in Lausanne is thus a historical irony as well as a symbolic act of reclaiming denied rights.

2. Political Claim Through Culture

In the modern world, culture is not just a folkloric element—it is a cornerstone of identity, sovereignty, and resistance. The Lausanne Kurdish Institute does more than academically preserve Kurdish culture; it redefines the Kurds’ right to self-determination in a cultural context. In this regard, the Institute does not instrumentalize culture but instead empowers political agency through cultural legitimacy.

3. An Institutional Expression of a Stateless Nation

Kurds remain the largest stateless nation in the Middle East. The Lausanne Kurdish Institute emerges as a form of “institutional sovereignty,” seeking to transcend statelessness through the production of knowledge. Even in the absence of a state, establishing such an institution reflects the Kurds’ desire to define their own history, language, grievances, and solutions—on their own terms and with their own voice.

4. International Legitimacy and the European Public Sphere

The decision to open the institute in Lausanne is both symbolic and strategic. Switzerland, known for its neutrality and diplomatic tradition, offers a valuable platform for the Kurdish pursuit of international legitimacy. The Institute has the potential to shape European public opinion, helping reframe the Kurdish issue not as a security threat but as a matter of human rights, identity, and democratic self-governance.

5. An Indirect Message to Turkey and Regional Powers

The Lausanne Kurdish Institute sends a clear message to Turkey and other regional states: Kurds are present not only in the mountains, but also in the academic world; they are seeking rights not only through political struggle, but also through intellectual production. This represents a rejection of outdated policies of denial and suppression and calls for a solution based on democratization, recognition, and dialogue.

The Lausanne Kurdish Institute is more than a cultural gain; it is the embodiment of a political vision materialized in an academic framework. It expresses the Kurdish people's desire to overcome historical silence through knowledge, defend their existence through documentation, and build their future through awareness. Therefore, the opening of the Institute is not merely the launch of a new institution—it marks the beginning of a new political era and a fresh Kurdish narrative.

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The Strategic Mind Rising from Imrali

 

A New Power on the Chessboard: The Strategic Mind Rising from Imralı

Recent geopolitical shifts in the Middle East and beyond have seen the diminishing influence of traditional actors while alternative power centers and ideological hubs are on the rise. In this context, the phrase "the power of Mr. Öcalan speaking from Imralı Island" is not just a symbolic expression; it also signifies the emergence of an alternative solution paradigm in the face of current international crises, unresolved ethnic conflicts, and systemic blockages.

The chess metaphor in the text is not merely a political analogy; it represents a multi-layered, long-term, and strategic way of thinking. In chess, the role, mobility, and objective of each piece are well-defined. In this context:

• The King (Russia) is under siege: Russia, after the Ukraine war, has found itself in global isolation and under economic sanctions, making it an effective but limited player.

• The Queen (Turkey) is a mere corpse: Turkey's role as a mediator in the Middle East and its influence in solution processes has gradually weakened, with internal political crises and external pressures curbing its maneuverability.

• The Castles (China and Iran) are at the frontline: Both China, with the Taiwan issue, and Iran, dealing with internal uprisings and external interventions, are under significant risk.

• The Bishops (North Korea, Pakistan): While sometimes influential in regional interventions, these countries lack the stability and legitimacy to change the global balance of power.

In this context, Öcalan’s long-developed "democratic confederalism" model can be seen as a new solution path, particularly in regions grappling with the crisis of the nation-state. Based on local democracy, women’s freedom, and an ecological society, this approach stands out as a compelling alternative in a world where centralized, militaristic models are failing.

The strategic mind rising from Imralı represents not only an ideological position but also a vision based on regional realities, prioritizing the right of peoples to self-determination. The power of this vision becomes even more apparent in the face of the collapse of classical players.

Nirxandin’s tweet offers a multi-layered perspective on the current global power dynamics and how alternative solutions are gaining traction in the face of the decline of traditional powers. The use of the chess metaphor is especially effective in illustrating the positions and vulnerabilities of the major global players—Russia, Turkey, China, Iran—and the power shifts that are currently underway.

The tweet presents Öcalan's model of "democratic confederalism" as a viable alternative in regions struggling with the crisis of the nation-state. This model, focusing on local democracy, women’s rights, and an ecological society, is proposed as a solution to the systemic failures of centralist, militaristic approaches. The suggestion here is that, as traditional state systems collapse or weaken, Öcalan’s model offers a more inclusive, decentralized, and progressive alternative.

By positioning key global players (Russia, Turkey, China, Iran) within the chessboard metaphor, Nirxandin highlights their current strategic limitations. For instance, Russia’s isolation after the Ukraine war, Turkey’s diminishing influence in the Middle East, and the struggles of China and Iran with both internal and external pressures create a scenario in which Öcalan’s model could offer a new way forward. This is particularly significant in a world where centralized, authoritarian models are faltering.

The notion of "democratic confederalism" is more than just an ideology; it is a solution that advocates for the right of peoples to determine their own destiny. Nirxandin emphasizes that this vision is not a detached ideological stance, but one that is grounded in real-world regional struggles, making it highly relevant in today's geopolitical climate.

Ultimately, this tweet calls attention to the shifting power dynamics in the world and proposes that Öcalan’s vision could be an essential alternative as traditional powers falter. Whether this vision will gain traction in global politics depends on how these unfolding dynamics evolve over time.

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Nechirvan Barzani A Charismatic Political Leader in the Kurdistan Region

 

Nechirvan Barzani, the current President of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, stands as one of the most prominent and influential political figures in the region. Known for his charisma, diplomatic acumen, and leadership capabilities, Barzani has played a crucial role in shaping the political landscape of the Kurdish region and beyond. His career is a testament to his remarkable blend of experience, strategic foresight, and multilingual proficiency, all of which have contributed to his significant standing in both regional and international politics.

A Legacy of Leadership

Nechirvan Barzani hails from one of the most powerful political families in the Kurdistan Region. As a member of the Barzani family, which has been central to the Kurdish struggle for autonomy and self-determination, Barzani's leadership is not only shaped by his personal ambition but also by the weight of his family's legacy. His uncle, the late Masoud Barzani, who served as the President of the Kurdistan Region, was a pivotal figure in Kurdish politics, and Nechirvan has built upon this foundation.

Having held key positions in the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), including Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, Nechirvan Barzani has demonstrated both competence and vision in navigating the complex political environment of the Middle East. His tenure as Prime Minister from 2012 to 2015 highlighted his ability to manage the region’s domestic affairs while handling external pressures from Baghdad, neighboring countries, and international powers.

Diplomatic Savvy and International Influence

One of Nechirvan Barzani's defining traits is his diplomatic ability. He has consistently positioned himself as a bridge between the Kurdish region and the wider world. Barzani is not only well-versed in the intricacies of local Kurdish politics but also understands the broader geopolitical forces that impact the Kurdistan Region. This understanding has allowed him to maintain strong relationships with various international players, from the United States to Turkey, and the European Union.

Nechirvan's multilingualism has played a significant role in his diplomatic successes. Fluent in Kurdish, Arabic, English, French, and with a solid understanding of the nuances of global diplomacy, he can communicate effectively with a broad spectrum of actors. This ability to speak multiple languages, particularly English and French, has allowed him to engage with Western powers on an equal footing, further solidifying his status as a respected leader in the region.

Political and Bureaucratic Mastery

In addition to his diplomatic skills, Barzani's ability to navigate the complex bureaucratic structures of both the KRG and Iraq’s federal government is noteworthy. The Kurdistan Region operates within the context of Iraq’s broader political system, which is often fraught with tensions between the federal government in Baghdad and the semi-autonomous Kurdish government. Throughout his political career, Nechirvan has adeptly balanced these competing interests.

His leadership has been marked by his ability to assert Kurdish interests while maintaining dialogue with Baghdad. His tenure has also been defined by efforts to improve the Kurdish region's infrastructure, economy, and security apparatus, even amid political and military challenges such as the fight against ISIS.

Nechirvan’s approach to governance is also highly strategic. His bureaucratic leadership has often been seen as calm, methodical, and inclusive, focusing on creating stability within the Kurdistan Region despite external pressures. His ability to maintain political unity within the KRG, despite various competing factions and interests, is a testament to his political astuteness.

Challenges and Future Prospects

Despite his successes, Nechirvan Barzani's leadership has not been without its challenges. The Kurdistan Region faces ongoing economic difficulties, often exacerbated by the political deadlock with Baghdad, fluctuating oil prices, and the impact of regional conflicts. Furthermore, the Barzani family's political dominance in the region has raised questions about the future of democratic processes within the KRG.

However, Nechirvan's ability to navigate these challenges with calm and calculated decision-making positions him well for continued leadership. His vision for the future of the Kurdistan Region, one that prioritizes both autonomy and cooperation with Iraq’s federal government, suggests that he will continue to play a key role in the evolving political landscape of the Middle East.

Nechirvan Barzani stands as a key political figure whose combination of charisma, strategic leadership, and multilingual capabilities have made him a vital player in the Kurdistan Region and in the broader Middle East. His background in the Barzani family’s legacy of leadership, coupled with his ability to navigate the complex bureaucratic, political, and diplomatic challenges of the region, makes him a formidable force in Kurdish and Iraqi politics.

As the President of the Kurdistan Region, Nechirvan Barzani’s influence is set to endure, and his leadership will continue to shape the trajectory of the Kurdish people’s struggle for autonomy, stability, and prosperity in an ever-changing geopolitical environment.

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The First Ceasefire and Global Headlines

   🕊️ PKK Ceasefires and Peace Talks Since 1993: What the International Community Saw

The conflict between Turkey and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) has spanned over four decades, but it hasn’t been without efforts for peace. Since 1993, the PKK has declared several unilateral ceasefires and engaged in negotiations—some secret, some public. While each process unfolded differently, international observers, NGOs, and media organizations have been constant witnesses to these developments.

Here’s a closer look at the key moments of the PKK’s ceasefire history and how the global community responded.

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🔹 1993: The First Ceasefire and Global Headlines

The PKK declared its first ceasefire in March 1993, announced by Abdullah Öcalan in the Bekaa Valley of Lebanon. This announcement made waves across international media, with BBC, Reuters, and The Guardian covering it.

The truce didn’t last long—largely due to political instability in Turkey and lack of official recognition—but it was the first time peace was openly placed on the table.

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🔹 1999–2004: Europe Watches Closely After Öcalan’s Capture

After Öcalan’s arrest in 1999, the PKK announced another extended ceasefire. During this time, the European Union paid close attention to the developments, with European Parliament observers, Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch monitoring the human rights situation in southeastern Turkey.

Turkey’s alignment with EU Copenhagen Criteria meant the Kurdish issue was no longer just a domestic problem—it had entered the international policy arena.

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🔹 2009–2011: The Secret Oslo Talks

The so-called Oslo Process was a series of confidential talks between PKK representatives and Turkish intelligence, held in Norway. Though informal, they reportedly involved Norwegian diplomats and UN-affiliated mediators acting as observers.

Despite being secretive, these talks were eventually leaked and covered by outlets like Al Jazeera, The New York Times, and Deutsche Welle, generating global interest. The process fell apart in 2011, with mutual blame and increased violence.

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🔹 2013–2015: The Most Open Peace Process and the Dolmabahçe Agreement

In 2013, a new peace process began—this time publicly. Turkish state officials and Kurdish representatives engaged in structured negotiations facilitated through messages from Abdullah Öcalan, who was imprisoned at the time.

This effort resulted in the Dolmabahçe Agreement in early 2015: a ten-point peace roadmap. The process was widely followed and covered by BBC World News, France 24, CNN International, and other major media outlets. EU rapporteurs expressed cautious optimism.

Unfortunately, renewed violence later that year, fueled by the conflict in Syria and rising tensions inside Turkey, ended the dialogue.

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🔹 Since 2015: Silence, Surveillance, and International Pressure

Since 2015, no formal peace process has resumed. However, NGOs like International Crisis Group, Amnesty International, and UN Special Rapporteurs have consistently urged both sides to return to dialogue and to prioritize human rights, media freedom, and cultural rights.

International media occasionally highlights the deteriorating situation, but press freedom in Turkey has made neutral, independent reporting difficult.

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🎯 Is Peace Still Possible?

From 1993 until today, the PKK has declared at least six ceasefires, with varying levels of engagement from the Turkish state. Each initiative has been shaped by changing governments, regional wars, and political climates.

Still, one constant remains: global eyes are watching. Whether through the EU, UN, or global press, there is continued international interest in a peaceful solution to the Kurdish conflict in Turkey.

The path forward likely depends on rebuilding mutual trust, international mediation, and recognition of past lessons. If another chance at peace arises, it may benefit from greater transparency, stronger legal frameworks, and sustained international support.

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Rojava and the Emerging Kurdish Power in the Middle East

Rojava is not merely the product of the Kurdish political movement in Syria; it is also the outcome of regional power vacuums, ideological transformations, and international interventions. Today, Rojava must be understood not just as a military force, but as a model and a potential center of Kurdish leadership in the Middle East. To evaluate its future, one must consider its historical roots, ideological formation, and geopolitical positioning.

1. Historical Background and Ideological Foundations

The Kurds in Syria have long suffered from systematic denial and assimilation policies. The 1962 census rendered thousands of Kurds stateless, the regime implemented Arabization policies in Kurdish-majority areas, and Kurdish language and culture were heavily suppressed. However, starting in the 1980s, with the presence of the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) in Syria, many Kurds were introduced to a new political and ideological discourse.

From this ground emerged the PYD (Democratic Union Party), founded in 2003 and ideologically aligned with the PKK’s “Democratic Confederalism” model developed by Abdullah Öcalan. This model rejects classical statehood in favor of grassroots self-governance, gender equality, and direct democracy, forming the foundational framework of what Rojava would later become—not just a military force, but a social transformation project.

2. The Birth of Rojava: Civil War and Strategic Opportunity

The outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011 presented a historic opportunity for the Kurdish movement. As the Assad regime withdrew from northern territories (Afrin, Kobani, and Jazira) in 2012, the PYD and its military wing, the YPG, took control and established a de facto autonomous administration.

This administration emphasized secular, leftist, and communitarian values, forming what became known as the three-canton system. In 2014, the siege of Kobani by ISIS became a turning point. The resistance of YPG and the all-female YPJ forces drew international attention, while U.S. air support cemented a partnership that brought Rojava global visibility.

3. The Strategic Space Opened by the U.S. and Rojava’s Leadership Ambition

As the original post suggests, the strategic space opened by the U.S. must be interpreted by Rojava not merely as a tactical military alliance, but as a historical opportunity to assert its own leadership.

This space—enabled by U.S. military, logistical, and political support—allowed Rojava not only to secure its territories but also to position itself as a leader within the broader Kurdish political movement. In contrast to the conservative-nationalist KDP in Iraqi Kurdistan, Rojava presents a secular, leftist, and grassroots-driven alternative Kurdish model with increasing regional appeal.

4. Syria as a Front in the Iran–West Confrontation and Rojava’s Geopolitical Role

As Western powers intensify their strategic confrontation with Iran, Syria has emerged as a critical front. Iran-backed militias and alliances with the Assad regime have made Syria a strategic depth for Iranian influence. In this context, Rojava has become an important balancing actor for the West—particularly the United States.

Thus, northern Syria is not only a Kurdish region; it is increasingly a geopolitical chessboard in the broader Iran-West proxy conflict. Rojava’s strategic alignment with the U.S. gives it both operational value and increased leverage in shaping the region’s future order.

5. The Decline of HTS and the Rise of New Actors

Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a radical Islamist faction based in Idlib, has long played a role in the Syrian opposition. However, Western powers are increasingly signaling that the era of relying on such radical groups is ending. The marginalization of HTS opens space for more “pragmatic” and secular actors like Rojava to gain ground.

This could significantly alter the actor landscape on the ground and strengthen Rojava’s position in any future political process or constitutional negotiations in Syria.

Rojava has evolved from a marginalized ethnic enclave into a military, ideological, and political force in the reconfiguring Middle East. It has utilized the strategic corridor created by U.S. involvement not only to survive but to project its leadership within the Kurdish political movement and beyond.

As the Iran-West conflict escalates and radical factions like HTS fade from relevance, Rojava’s significance is likely to grow. However, the durability of this ascent depends not only on continued international support but also on Rojava’s ability to consolidate its social base, preserve ideological coherence, and adapt politically to rapidly changing regional dynamics.

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Legal Kurdish Politics: Dream or Reality

 If the Turkish state created a legal framework and allowed the PKK to engage in open politics, participate in elections, enter parliament, even become the main opposition party, then what space would there be for Kurdish demands in a democracy where even the CHP struggles to find ground?" opens up serious grounds for discussing the nature of democracy in Turkey, state-society relations, and the structural roots of the Kurdish issue.

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1. Legal Political Ground: Not “PKK” Per Se, But Legitimizing Kurdish Representation

First, it's important to distinguish something: as it currently stands, it is practically impossible for the PKK—a group based on armed struggle—to participate legally in politics. But the spirit of your question seems to be:

“If the state allowed a structure aligned with PKK's demands or ideology to engage in legal politics, how far could Kurdish politics go, and how free could it be?”

Let’s assume that Turkey is now dealing with a disarmed Kurdish movement and that this group can fully participate in legal, democratic politics. Even in that case, the key issue becomes:

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2. In a Democracy Where Even the CHP Struggles, What Room is There for Kurdish Demands?

This is perhaps the most critical part of the question. The boundaries of democracy in Turkey have historically been narrow—not only for the Kurdish movement, but also for:

• the center-left (e.g., CHP),

• socialist movements,

• even liberal opposition voices.

For example:

• The CHP has long been constrained by military-bureaucratic tutelage,

• The media and capital are largely under government influence,

• Judicial independence is weak,

• And the “national security” paradigm constantly puts pressure on all opposition.

So in such a system, it's not just Kurdish politics, but any non-state-aligned political movement that faces significant challenges. Legalizing the PKK (or something like it) doesn't automatically create a truly free democratic space.

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3. What Are the Kurdish Demands, and Where Do They Get Blocked?

Kurdish historical and current demands can roughly be grouped into:

• Right to mother tongue (education and use in the public sphere)

• Stronger local governance (not necessarily autonomy, but a real decentralization)

• Cultural recognition (names, holidays, symbols)

• Constitutional recognition of Kurdish identity

• Truth and reconciliation (regarding state violence, disappearances, village evacuations, etc.)

But each of these demands clashes directly with Turkey’s foundational state ideology—based on unitary structure, single nation, and a single flag. The current system tends to treat these identity-based demands as threats to territorial integrity or as "separatism."

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4. Is There Space for Kurdish Demands to Be Expressed?

Theoretically, yes. But that would require three major transformations:

a. Redefining the State:

Without moving away from the “monolithic” definition of the Turkish Republic and adopting a more pluralistic, inclusive notion of citizenship, the Kurdish issue cannot be resolved. This requires a mindset shift—not only in law, but also in education, the media, and the bureaucracy.

b. A Strong Rule of Law:

In an environment where Kurdish politicians are constantly arrested, parties shut down, and elected mayors replaced by state-appointed trustees, democratic political production becomes almost impossible. Judicial independence, press freedom, and functioning democratic mechanisms are essential.

c. Social Reconciliation and Mutual Trust:

For decades, both Kurds and Turks have looked at each other with fear, anger, and prejudice. That’s why even legal Kurdish politics is often criminalized. This issue demands the PKK’s disarmament, the softening of the state’s security-focused mindset, and a society ready to face its history.

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5. Conclusion: “Legal Politics is Not Enough”

In short: just making the PKK or the Kurdish political movement legal is not sufficient for Kurds to freely express their demands.

The Kurdish issue is not just a matter of armed conflict or legal politics—it's the most visible manifestation of Turkey's failure to fully democratize.

So if even the CHP, the main opposition party, struggles to breathe under the current system, Kurdish demands can only be addressed through deep, structural democratization of the system.

And this is not just a Kurdish issue—
It’s a problem for all of Turkey.

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